Introduction
Political economy has for long studied the effects of political representation (ideologies and the identity of governing party) on the amount and composition of public spending. 1 More recently, building on the theoretical work of Downs (1957) , Alesina (1998) and Besley and Coate (1997) , interest has centered on the causal effects of political partisanship on political outcomes (e.g. Petterson-
Lidbom 2008) and on whether voters affect policies or choose political platforms (Lee, Moretti and Butler, 2006, Ferreira and Gyourko 2008) . This paper focuses on the question of how political representation affects how public services are procured.
The reason for this focus is that public procurement constitutes a large -15% by OECD estimates (OECD, 2005) -and increasing part of economic activity. While there is a growing empirical literature on procurements and procurement auctions (e.g. Marion 2007, Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti, 2007) , the political aspects of procurement decisions have to the best of our knowledge not been analyzed empirically before. We offer such an analysis by asking how the political identity of the governing party affects whether or not to procure a given service or good, and if, how to procure it. To this end, we focus on the following questions:
Which municipalities procure; whether conditional on procuring, the procurement has open or restricted (by-invitation-only) entry; and conditional on having restricted entry, how many firms are invited. We then turn utilizing the relative strength of our data -information on the bids and municipal choices -and analyze the question of what determines whose bid gets chosen.
Our aim is to contribute to the literature by studying public procurement auctions of a clearly defined low-tech product, (internal) cleaning service contracts, using data from Swedish municipalities in the 1990s. We have chosen cleaning services because of their very simple production process that should make them amenable to being procured. The service is simple to contract on and, as we will demonstrate, does not vary much in (unobserved) quality. 2 For the same reason, there should be relatively little reason to depart from standard auction formats, and from the policy of granting the contract to the lowest bidder.
Sweden provides a good testing ground for us for two primary reasons.
First, it has been argued that despite a multiparty structure, there is a natural division into right-and left-wing in Swedish politics that matters for policy outcomes (e.g. Aronsson and Wikström 1996 , Dahlberg and Johansson 2002 , PetterssonLidbom 2001 , and Hanes 2007 : Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) finds, for example, that Swedish right-wing local governments accumulate more debt than left-wing ones if they are certain to be replaced. 3 It has also been documented that the Swedish left-wing municipalities spend and tax 2-3 percent more than the right-wing local governments and appear to care more about and be able to influence local unemployment (Pettersson-Lidbom 2008) . second reason why Sweden provides a good testing ground for us is that it applied the EU procurement law.
As such the general principles of our research questions are of interest for all countries applying the EU directives. Interestingly, the EU directives of that time municipalities high degrees of freedom in organizing procurements. Although the directives of today are much sharper in many dimensions they are not in the assignment rules, the questions posted in this paper are thereby still valid. 4 In terms of methodology, we build on the important papers by Lee, Moretti and Butler (2008) , Lee (2008) and Petterson-Lidbom (2008) who outline a regression discontinuity approach to studying the causal effects of political partisanship.
The idea, clearly exposited in Lee (2008) , is that comparing outcomes in municipalities where the left-wing party barely won to outcomes in municipalities where it barely lost allows one to identify the pure party effect on outcomes. We utilize this approach in studying who procures, type of entry, and how many firms are invited.
We find that the propensity to procure cleaning services is not affected by the political identity of the governing party. Conditional on procuring, every municipality grabbed the freedom allowed by the law, as no municipality committed to a standard (price) auction format of any kind. Nor did any municipality choose to have an explicit scoring rule. We find that entry was restricted for 30% of the time and that the political identity of the governing party is not correlated with organizing an auction with restricted entry. These results are, on the one hand, in line with those of Ferreira and Gyourko (2008) who study U.S. mayoral elections and who find no partisan effects. On the other hand, our results offer an interesting contrast to Petterson-Lidbom who finds that Swedish left-wing municipal governments tax 2-3 percent more than right-wing municipal governments, and that they employ 4 percent more workers. Given his results, one would have expected that left-wing majority councils would be less likely to procure public services.
More in line with Petterson-Lidbom, we find that conditional on organizing an 4 Public procurement continues to create controversy in Sweden even today: One of the leading Swedish daily newspapers, Dagens Nyheter, has in 2007 had several articles on the functioning of auction with restricted entry, the number of firms invited to bid does vary with political identity, with a left-wing majority in the council leading to fewer firms being invited.
To utilize the rich bid level data at our disposal, we resort to a standard discrete choice framework. As we observe several bids for every object (premises) for which cleaning services are procured, we can condition all additive object / auction / municipality unobservables. We then study how the identity of the ruling party affects the price sensitivity of the municipality, and the revealed preferences for bidder type, keeping the bids constant.
Municipalities grabbed the freedom allowed by the law to choose the winner on the basis of "best economic value", but appear to have left its contents completely undefined. Probably as a result of this, the lowest bidder does not win 58% of the time, and conditional on the lowest bid not winning, the municipalities end up paying on average 43% more than the lowest bid. In the raw data, the probability of the lowest bid not winning is 62.3% (49.8%) in municipalities with rightwing (left-wing) councils, and the difference is significant at 1% level. This result on the role of the governing party identity is confirmed when we apply the standard random utility framework to study the bureaucrat behavior (pioneered by McFadden 1975 (pioneered by McFadden , 1976 : Our bid level analysis of which bid gets chosen shows that while all councils are price sensitive, the councils with left-wing majority are 1.5 times as price sensitive as the right-wing councils. In these estimations we control for unobserved heterogeneity, such as municipal and object (e.g. the and alleged misconduct in public procurement.
school which is to be cleaned) level unobservables. We find no systematic evidence of bids being endogenous.
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These findings have implications for the literature on public spending and provision of services. There is a long history of patronage in government contracts with private firms, and market-oriented procurement is often advocated as a means to block political concerns out of the process of providing public services.
Our findings cast some doubt on this view. Our findings also have implications for the economics literature on procurement auctions. We document that bureaucrat behavior and incentives matter in public procurement, especially in auctions in which the non-price attributes of bid(der)s are allowed to be a determinant of the award decision. We observe that the political identity of the governing party matters at micro-level, i.e., at the level of individual auction outcomes. This is not consistent with what is typically assumed in the literature on procurement auctions nor with parties preferring similar procurement (policy) outcomes in equilibrium (as predicted e.g. by strict convergence in the classical median voter models).
In the following section, we describe in detail the legal and institutional environment, the product(s) (i.e., the objects of bidding) and the data. In section three we present our results on the first three questions. Section four is devoted to studying the choice behavior of municipalities. To this end we develop a random utility model of choosing the winning bid. We discuss our results in section five, and offer conclusions in section six.
5 While our object -procurement auctions -necessarily makes the well developed and large auction literature relevant for us, we consciously have chosen to study questions that allow us to not take a stand on the issues at the heart of that literature: information of bidders, bidder types, and bidder strategies. The reason for this is simple: The complete freedom allowed by the Swedish procurement rules means that it seems impossible or at least extremely challenging to write down a (structural) auction model that would capture the essence of the environment in which the Swedish firms made participation and bidding decisions.
2 Institutional environment and data
Institutional environment and procurement law
Our data come from the period 1990-1998, and more than 90% of the data is from the latter half of the period. During the latter half, public procurement in Sweden was governed by the Public Procurement Act (LOU 1992 (LOU :1528 . While the law
was not yet in force in 1990-1993, the rules that applied then were essentially the same as under the Public Procurement Act. This law specified the environment in which the Swedish municipalities and bidding firms acted and was based on the (then-prevailing) EU directives.
From the point of view of this paper the following features of the law are central: First, the municipalities were allowed to freely choose whether to procure or to produce in-house. 6 Conditional on deciding to procure, the law allowed them to decide whether to allow open entry or not. As for the mode of entry, the law allowed for four types of procurement mechanisms. 7 The main difference between these is that two (Simplified, Open) allowed free entry while two (Restricted, Negotiated 8 ) did not. Conditional on restricting entry, the law allowed the municipalities to decide how many (and which firms) to invite. 6 We take municipalities' decisions about the number of cleaning service contracts that they procured, as well as their characteristics, as given. It is of course entirely possible that some municipalities decided to procure cleaning services for, say, some of their schools while keeping the cleaning of others in-house. For a study of the behavior and market orientation of the municipalities of a neighboring Scandinavian country (Denmark), see Christoffersen and Paldam (2003) . 7 The law specified a threshold value of procurement (200 000€), below which Simplified and Direct were allowed, and above which Open, Restricted or Negotiated were required. The question if procurement mechanisms with restricted entry can be empirically motivated with high implementation costs is analyzed in Lundberg (2005) . Using the same data as in the present paper Lundberg finds no evidence of such relation. 8 While negotiations were allowed in Simplified and Negotiated procurements (see chapter 5, "Procurement of services", in the Public Procurement Act, LOU 1992:1528), they were not used in the procurements that we study.
Second, while the law allowed a municipality to arrange simultaneous procurements (procurement auctions), combinatorial bidding was not applied (i.e., the procurement rules instructed firms to submit one bid per object and the municipality should accordingly have made decisions "object-by-object"). Third, only sealed bids were allowed. Fourth, the lowest bidder should have won. Finally, there was an exception to the "lowest bid wins" -rule: A municipality had the freedom to deem that some other bid was "most advantageous economically" when quality, environmental aspects, service and maintenance etc. were also taken into account. The law did not force municipalities to use any explicit scoring rules. 9 Nor did it mention for example the locality of the bidder as an allowable dimension, but seems not to have ruled it out either. Under the current rules, it is illegal.
It is illustrative of the atmosphere of the time that the freedom allowed by the law to deviate from choosing the lowest bid was seen as beneficial. The following quote from a book by a public sector lawyer testifies to this:
"The tender having the lowest price offered should be accepted. If it has been stated in the advertisement that the most economically advantageous tender will be accepted, factors specified therein can be taken into consideration in the assessment of tenders. 9 This has changed after our observation period, partly because of EU wide directives that dictate that as a general rule, explicit scoring has to be used. However, it is important to keep in mind that the clear purpose of the Public Procurement Act of 1992 was that if the lowest bidder is not awarded the contract, this has to be because along some well-specified (and ex ante notified) dimensions, some higher bid is "more economically advantageous".
Besides the lax procurement law, an important aspect of the institutional environment is that we study decision making by Swedish municipalities in which a large fraction of the production of public services of the Swedish welfare state is done. This means, first, that they operate within a homogenous and common political framework. Second, decision making is delegated: The principals are the inhabitants of the municipality and the agent the municipal council (or more concretely, the civil servants working under the council's management, e.g., the personnel of municipal procurement units/offices). Third, the members of Swedish councils are members of political parties and the political system can be characterized, at least to a first approximation, bipartisan (see, e.g., Pettersson-Lidbom 2008) . Finally, the decision making in the Swedish councils is influenced by political bargaining and thinking, making the design and award decisions in public procurement auctions subject to political ideology considerations.
While the models of Alesina (1998) and Besley and Coate (1997) provide an explanation for political partisanship, neither the prior political economy and science literature, nor the literature on public procurement, gives clear-cut predictions on the effect of political representation on procurement policies, except perhaps on the decision on whether or not to procure in the first place. The available evidence from Sweden suggests that when in control, the left-wing majority councils of Swedish municipalities employ systematically more government workers and are thereby able to influence local unemployment (Pettersson-Lidbom 2008).
In our context, this political preference may result in a reduced likelihood to procure.
As the theoretical predictions are either lacking or mixed, it is an empirical matter to determine whether left-wing or right-wing majority councils prefer more open entry or if entry is restricted, invite more bidders (or particular types of bidders), and how the parties weight price when choosing the winner.
Description of the data
Our bidding and procurement data come from a survey, administered to all Swedish municipalities asking them for procurement documents regarding internal cleaning services. The documents are contract notice, technical specification, list of bidders, bids, and the decision protocol stating the winner of the contract. The response rate was 79.5 percent. We don't know if all the Swedish municipalities that organized procurement auctions in cleaning services are in our data: 59 of the 229 municipalities that replied to the survey organized at least one procurement auction in cleaning services during 1990-98. We have supplemented this data with municipality characteristics, obtained from Statistics Sweden (SCB).
A first look at the documents show that though the non-price criteria, if any, should have been posted in advance, the weight attached to each criterion in the evaluation was unknown to the bidders prior to the bidding. 10 In other words, municipalities did not use any explicit scoring rules during our observation period.
Our hands-on analysis of the procurement documentation shows that conditional on procuring, every municipality grabbed the freedom allowed by the law, as no municipality opted for and committed to a standard (price) auction format of any kind. Nor did any municipality choose to have an explicit scoring rule. Table 1 describes how the procurements in our data are organized. Procurement is an instance where a municipality purchases cleaning services for one or more "objects" through a joint procurement procedure. The objects are the premises to be cleaned and the bidders are Swedish firms. This feature of the data means that the event of procurement can consist of one or more "auctions". While a separate, non-combinatorial auction is run for each object, there is an element of sealed, pay-your-bid "multi-object auctions" to these procurements. As the column titled "All" shows, the number of procurements in our data is 131 and the total number objects is 758, of which 721 are included in our analysis. 11 The number of objects per procurement varies from one (single-unit) to 74, and the number of bids per object from one to 37. Some 50 objects obtain at most 3 bids, half the objects 4-7 bids, and another 200 8-11 bids. We observe a total of 5926 bids. The frequency at which the various procurement mechanisms were used is also re- share of inhabitants having a higher education (highedu m ) and a measure of political ideology. Following earlier work with Swedish municipal level data (e.g. Aronsson and Wikström 1996) , our measure of political ideology is council composition. We define red m to be an indicator for the median voter of council m, i.e., it is equal to one if there is a left-wing majority (redprop m > 50%) and zero otherwise.
nious way to capture the main division in Swedish politics. 13 Left-wing majority councils auctioned 454 objects, right-wing majority councils 267.
14 Table 2 describes the objects. The vast majority of them are schools or daycare centers. The objects vary according to the characteristics we observe: size in square meters (size mi ), contract length (length mi ), prolongation period (period mi ), and required cleaning frequency (freq mi ). The contract length is the stated contract period and the prolongation period states the period that the contract can be extended with if the current holder of the contract has performed well after the contract period has expired. The prolongation period is normally one or two years.
The cleaning frequency is the number of days during a year the object should be cleaned.
[ The bidders in the procurements are Swedish cleaning service firms. There are in total 322 firms in our data. They can be divided roughly into four categories.
First, there are 4 firms that operate nationally ("National"). This group includes the largest, and some medium sized firms. For confidentiality reasons we have labeled these national firms "Ns", s = a, b, c, d. The largest national firms "Na"
and "Nb" submit bids for most objects, whereas "Nc" and "Nd", two other national firms, submit bids for 6-10% of objects. Second, there are mid-size firms that are active regionally ("Regional"). According to our classification, 70.5% of the firms are regional. The third group consists of small local firms that only bid in one or a couple of municipalities ("Local"). The local firms constitute 27.5% of the firms in the sample. The final group consists of firms that used to be the clean-ing department of a municipality, but have at some point been transformed into a company that still is owned by the municipality ("In-house production"). An inhouse municipal production unit participates in bidding for almost 40% of objects.
[ [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] when the Public Procurement Act was in force. Regional firms submit most of the bids (41%), followed by the few national firms (30%) and local firms (21%). Inhouse firms submit 8% of the bids.
On average, there were 7.45 bidders in the auctions. For almost 58% of the 721 objects, the municipalities did not choose the lowest bid. Moreover, some municipalities never award an object to the lowest bidder. Conditional on the lowest bid not winning, the average difference between the winning and lowest bid is 42.9%. 15 The raw correlation between the lowest bid not winning and the number of entrants (bids) is 0.17 (significant at 5% level). In Column 1 of Table 4 , we report the results of a Logit regression in which the dependent variable is an indicator that is equal to one for those municipalities that reported to have organized at least one procurement auction and is zero otherwise. The raw data reveals that only a minority of the municipalities used the 17 We have checked the robustness of the results to (not) including municipal characteristics as controls, and by estimating the models using a linear probability model. As the results from the LPM estimations are mostly in line with those reported, we omit them for brevity. 18 The sample varies over these three questions: for the who procures question, the sample consists of 226 Swedish municipalities. For the question on type of entry, the sample consists of 130 pro-option: Only 26% (59/229) of the municipalities in the data organized at least one procurement auction in cleaning services during 1990-98. The results show that the propensity to procure cleaning services is not correlated with the political identity of the governing party. This is not in line with the view that left-wing municipalities are systematically against market-orientation, nor with the available Swedish evidence which suggests that the left-wing Swedish municipalities prefer larger public sector (Pettersson-Lidbom 2008) . If one believes that this sort of political thinking characterizes Swedish municipalities with left-wing majority councils, it is a bit surprising that the preference does not result in a reduced likelihood to procure in our data.
In Column 2 of (7) only restricted entry procurements, and none (4) both used both entry formats.
The results show that the political identity of the governing party is not correlated with organizing an auction with restricted entry.
The question of how many firms get invited to an auction with a restricted entry is addressed in Columns 3 of Table 4 . The raw data shows that in auctions with restricted entry, there are 7.8 (5.9) bidders on average if the municipality has right-wing (left-wing) council. The difference is statistically significant (t-value 2.7). 19 There is more variation in the participation rates of local and in-house firms in auctions with restricted entry. We report results for a count (Poisson) recurements. Finally, for the question of how many firms get invited, the sample consists of 314 auctions (objects for which services were procured).
gression in which the dependent variable is the number of invited firms. As for the identity of the invited bidders, regional and national firms are nearly always invited: Their participation rates are 99.0% and 98.4%, respectively. 20 There are 24 restricted entry procurements and 15 negotiated procurements (both thus not having free entry). In these 39 procurements, 314 objects were procured. The number of invited firms varies within a procurement (i.e., over objects), making an object level analysis meaningful. 21 We have also run a Poisson regression in which we control for the number and type of contracts (objects). The qualitative results on the role of the political identity of the governing party did not change. 22 For the who procures estimations, these were measured in 1990; for the type of entry and number of invited firms estimations, these were measured in the year of the procurement. For the latter two estimations, we also added a year dummy to the control vector.
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Modeling the choice of the winning bid
Our main research question focuses on the determinants of the choice of the winning bid(der). Raw data shows that in right-wing (left-wing) councils, the probability of the lowest bid not winning is 62.3% (49.8%). The difference is significant at 1% level. Conditional on the lowest bid not winning, the winning bid is on average 46.5% (35.2%) higher than the lowest bid in the right-wing (left-wing) municipalities. This difference is however insignificant. These numbers and tests suggest that rightwing councils award the contract more often to a bidder other than the lowest but conditional on doing so, they do not pay on average a larger premium over the lowest bid.
To study the choice of the winning bid in greater detail, we adopt the random utility model (McFadden 1974 
where mi ψ refers to the additively separable effects of municipal/procurement/object characteristics, mij bid to the bid (price) of firm j for object i in municipality m (in 10 000 kronor per square meter), mij q to 'quality', and mij ε to an error term.
The municipal/procurement/object characteristics, mi ψ , reflect the mean utility that municipality m obtains when it has its premises cleaned and the objectspecific deviations from the mean. It thus captures all additively separable effects of observable and unobservable municipal characteristics on municipal utility, e.g., regional structure, demographics, income distribution, voter preferences, and propensity to procure services. The term also refers to (un)observable object characteristics, such as the type, size, location, etc. of the object. It captures differences in the indirect utility derived, e.g., from having a clean health center as compared to having clean sports facilities. The assumed additive separability of these effects and the distributional (logit) assumption on the error term (see below) allow us to condition all these effects out in the estimation. As mi ψ also controls for voter preferences (the role of the polynomial in the regression discontinuity specifications estimated above), we do not need to include the polynomial of the composition of the council. allowing us to test whether the weight depends on the political ideology. One reason to test for this is that "bid preference programs" may explain the data. These programs award a contract to the lowest preferred bidder, provided that its bid is 23 An example is the locality of the firm, if the local politicians care about the firm's profits. Other such positive externalities include income taxes and employment (see Vagstad 1995) . 24 The term controls in addition for the additively separable effects on the utility of those characteristics of the procurement event that do not vary over the bidding firms, such as whether or not close enough to the lowest bid of the non-preferred bidders (e.g., McAfee and McMillan 1989 , Krasnokutskaya and Seim 2006 , Marion 2007 . These programs give some firms preferential treatment, often because it is considered to be politically desirable.
The third term in (1), mij q , refers to quality and is included because municipalities may have resorted to a scoring auction, which balances the quality of the bid(der) and price, or a to "beauty contest", in which no scoring rule is announced (Che 1993, Asker and Cantillon 2006 care about the quality of cleaning of a particular object for which firms are bidding (i.e., ex ante object-level quality differences) and where 2 mj q captures the possibility that there are firm-specific, as opposed to object-specific, quality differences (i.e., ex ante corporate-level quality differences).
The extensive documentation available to us on the technical specifications of the procurements and the specifics of the bids however suggest strongly that 1 0 mij q ≡ , i.e., that there are no ex ante quality differences at the object-level. That is, conditional on the corporate identity of the bidders, there are no ex ante discernible quality differences between the bids for a specific object. The most compelling support for this claim is provided by the technical specifications of the procurement instructions. We obtained the procurement instructions of all the objects (premises) in the data. These are in general very detailed -an example of a typical technical specification can be found in Appendix A. Besides including a entry to the auction was open and whether or not the object was auctioned as a part of a multiobject procurement. 25 Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2003) compare auctions and negotiations in procurement. They stress the tradeoffs between hard-to-observe quality and price when objects are complex and contractual design incomplete.
detailed description of the premises to be cleaned, the frequency of cleaning, cleaning method, cleaning substances that are preferred, and cleaning equipment that is to be employed, they also go into much more minute detail. 26 In addition, the submitted bids reveal that firms almost without exception only detail i) the object for which the firm is bidding, ii) the name and contact information of the bidder, iii) and the price, despite the forms providing space for additional information (see Appendix A for an example of a typical bid). If such information is provided, it is invariably uninformative as to potential quality differences. 27 Further supporting evidence comes from interviews that we conducted and especially the type of service we are studying.
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Even if there are no object-level differences in the quality of the bids, there may have been corporate-specific quality differences (i.e., 2 mj q ≠ 0). Indeed, the only piece of information in the bids in which the firms were able to 'differentiate 26 For example, it is common to state requirements as to the professional education of cleaning staff to be used. Similarly, the monitoring of cleaning is often specified in detail, and it is standard to require the firm to inform the municipality on several features of the working process, to provide records of hours of work, workforce and machinery employed etc.. As if this wasn't enough, in several instances the procurement instructions go into great detail as to how each space (e.g. classroom, toilet) is to be cleaned. All this suggests that it is very hard to differentiate one-self quality-wise. 27 A typical piece of extra information is that the firm j plans to use certain substance S in cleaning, say, school i. The procurement instructions however always dictate in detail the environmental aspects of the substances to be used, and the extra information provided by firm j is that substance S fulfills these criteria. This also suggests that the firms were not able to differentiate themselves quality-wise in the bids. 28 We interviewed a (former) civil servant who used to be in charge of public procurement, and three industry representatives. While the former civil servant maintained that local firms provide higher quality through better local presence, he also mentioned a nationally operating firm as providing similar quality. The three firm representatives were unanimous in stating that all firms provide equal quality in public procurements. (One of them, a local operator, maintained that they provide higher quality in private procurement.). They also mentioned that procurement instructions in public procurement are so well-defined that there is no room for (large) qualitydifferences. Our final support for the claim of no quality differences at the object-level is based on the type of service we are studying. The literature on the relative merit of negotiation versus auctions (e.g. Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis 2003 and the literature cited therein) is -for good reasons -mainly interested in "customized goods such as new buildings, fighter jets or consulting services" (Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis 2003, pp. 1) . We take a completely opposite track by studying internal cleaning services. Our, admittedly layperson view of (good or bad) cleaning is that "you cannot describe it, but you know it when you see it". Cleaning is a labor-intensive, low-tech service, the quality of which is easily monitored, for which the requisite skills are relatively easily themselves' (besides the price) is the corporate identity of the bidder. To capture this, we include firm fixed effects.
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The last term in (1), mij ε , is a stochastic error term that captures intrinsic randomness in municipality decision making. It allows for idiosyncrasies decision-making that resulted every now and then in the lowest bidder not winning.
These idiosyncrasies may have been driven in part by lack of established procurement practices and by the flexible legislative procurement framework of the 1990s. We assume that mij ε was unobservable to bidders and distributed i.i.d. type I extreme value.
Given the above assumptions, the probability that bidder w wins in a pro- 
As specified, the model corresponds to the standard conditional/mixed logit model and can be estimated by maximum likelihood (ML). The ML estimation assumes that the bids are exogenous, and as we report below, the exogeneity of bids can be tested and is not rejected by the data.
acquired and are wide-spread, and cleaning services is an industry in which barriers to entry are relatively low. 29 It is worth point out two things about this specification: First, the econometric model already conditions on mi ψ , i.e., on the (direct) effects of municipal/procurement/object characteristics on the indirect utility. Second, when jk X includes firm (type) dummies, 0 k jk X α captures fixed firm (firm type) characteristics. These terms control for the effect on choice of permanent quality differences between firms that are valued similarly by all municipalities. Together with the bids, these terms thus allow controlling e.g. for the presence of a bid/price preference program in which all municipalities run a similar, biased procurement auction that award contracts to the lowest preferred bidders (say, to local firms), provided that their bids are close enough to the lowest bid of the non-preferred bidder. For column (2), we additionally include the three firm type -dummies. In column (3), we replicate the estimations of column (2), except that we add dummies for all firms with at least 20 bids (the results are robust to using a lower cutoff; see the robustness tests). 30 These dummies allow for firm-specific deviations from the firm-type dummies. Each column displays the results of Wald-tests for the null hypotheses that the sum of the coefficients of the bid variables is zero.
Empirical results

Main results
As the table shows, both the bid's and bid-left wing majority interaction's coefficients are always negative and significant and the weight put on price varies with political ideology: Leftwing municipalities put much more weight on the bids and the increase in the weight is always statistically significant. The first result suggests the municipalities do not ignore price when deciding whom to award the contract. This is a somewhat surprising finding, because in the raw data, the lowest bid wins rarely (less than half of the time) and the price difference between the lowest and winning bid is large (despite the negligible differences in service quality). The second result suggests that while all councils are price sensitive, 31 the councils with a left-wing majority are 1.5 times as price sensitive as the rightwing councils. This result is robust across the columns. Both the firm type dummies and the firm fixed effects are jointly significant. The data thus support the largest specification, reported in column (3). We have tested whether the firm type 30 There are 322 firms in the sample, some of which only have a few bids. 31 Note that in a conditional logit, one cannot calculate marginal effects.
dummies should be interacted with red m but the data suggests not as the interactions are jointly insignificant in all specifications.
[TABLE 5 HERE]
Robustness tests
We have explored the robustness of our results in five ways. Taking each of them in turn:
First, one might be worried that bids are endogenous for various reasons.
We (see Appendix B for details) have explored this, using the control function approach of Train (2005, 2006) . As reported in Table 5 , while the Null hypothesis of no endogeneity is rejected in some specifications, this result is not robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects. Our reading of these results is that we have no firm evidence of endogeneity of bids.
The second concern to address is that the multi-object nature of the data may explain the observed behavior. In many instances, a municipality procured cleaning services for several premises simultaneously. To minimize immediate procurement costs, the municipalities should have awarded each contract to the lowest bidder. In a multi-object context such a procedure may however be a source of inefficiency (e.g. Jehiel and Moldovanu 2003) . The municipalities may thus have taken an aggregate of the bids into account, even if the rules instructed the firms to submit bids object-by-object and the municipalities to make decisions object-by-object. To test whether the aggregate bid matter for the choice (there are no combinatorial bids in the data), we include two new regressors to the choice model: The first is mij avgbid , computed as the weighted average bid (10 000 kronor/sq.m.) of firm j (weighted by object size) that it submitted for the objects that were auctioned simultaneously with object i. The second is mij rat , defined as the fraction of objects for which firm j submitted a bid (also measured using sq.m.) in the procurement in which object i was auctioned. The underlying assumption is that, after having conditioned out additively separable multi-object features that are constant over firms within an object and a procurement, the weighted average of the submitted bids is a proxy for the multi-object characteristic that the municipalities care about when making the award decision.
The results (not reported) show that the inclusion of these two new regressors does not change our main findings. For example, the coefficients of red m and red m *bid mij are now -177 and -113. We find some evidence that the municipalities have taken the aggregate of the bids into account, as mij avgbid obtains a negative (-5.502) and highly significant coefficient (p-value < 0.01).
For our third robustness check we change the way the firm fixed effects are -196 and -163 . While the latter point estimate is clearly smaller than that reported in Column (3) of Table 5 , it is within two standard errors (38) of the red m *bid mij coefficient in Column (3).
The fourth robustness check considers the effects of fly-by-night firms who bid (very) low but are known to provide (very) poor quality, leading to municipalities not choosing the lowest bid. We test for the presence of such firms by excluding from the sample all objects for which the difference (in percentage terms) between the lowest and 2 nd lowest bid is in the 95 th percentile. Re-estimating the conditional logit model(s) reproduces the results reported above in Table 5 with minor quantitative changes: The coefficients of red m and red m *bid mij are now -199 and -96 and within a standard deviation of our results in Column (4) of Table 5 .
Finally, we estimate a logit model in which the dependent variable is whether or not the lowest bid wins and the explanatory variables are the difference between the lowest and 2 nd lowest bid, an interaction of this difference with red m , and all five municipality characteristics. This estimation echoes our earlier findings about the price sensitivity of political parties: The larger the difference, the more likely that the lowest bid wins. The effect is not significant for rightwing majority councils (coeff. 6.212, p-value 0.875) but is highly significant in councils with a left-wing majority (coeff. 292.012, p-value 0.000).
Discussion
At the first glance, one might think that our two main empirical findings -that left-wing majority councils seem to invite fewer firms conditional on organizing a restricted entry auction, and that they are more price-sensitive -are at odds with each other. The latter suggests that left-wing majority councils are more aggressive procurers while the former can be interpreted to suggest that they are at the same time more selective in which firms to invite (conditional on having restricted entry) and thus more accommodating towards the bidders.
A challenge in giving our results a structural interpretation is that in models of imperfect information, a given causal effect may mask different structural interpretations. One of the possible interpretations of our results and the one we put tentatively forth is that right-wing majority councils are more pro-competition than left-wing majority councils. This would be the case if the cleaning service procurement auctions were independent private value auctions with exogenous entry. One could then interpret the finding that left-wing majority councils invite fewer bidders as being anti-competition: Within the independent private value paradigm, an increase in the exogenous number of bidders typically leads to an increase in the competitiveness of the auction (whereas an endogenous increase in the number of bidders due to selective entry may have a non-monotonous effect;
see Li and Zheng 2009 and the references therein). 33 Similarly, resorting to papers on favoritism in auctions (such as McAfee and McMillan 1989 , Burguet and Che 2004 , Vagstad 1995 , and Rezende 2004 , one could view the result that right-wing majority councils are less price-sensitive as evidence for them being procompetition. The reason for this is that if the bidders are asymmetric, a procompetitive procurer may lower the expected winning bid if it explicitly favors weaker bidders over the others. The non-favored bidders would as a consequence bid more aggressively. Such an auctioneer would seem less price sensitive as she would every once in a while choose some other but the lowest bid.
Verifying whether this, or some other similar explanation, is in line with the data would necessitate structural modeling and a careful analysis of the information regime and is beyond the scope of this paper. 34 Let us however briefly outline arguments for and against the above interpretation of our results. In favor is the fact that we study cleaning services. This means that most of the uncertainty (unlike, say, in oil drilling) emanates from firm specific cost shocks (like availability of personnel, distances to the premises etc.) rather than shocks common to all bidders that would have to do with surprises in e.g. how many hours it takes to 33 In general, an increase in the exogenous number of bidders does not have to increase the competitiveness of an auction (Pinkse and Tan 2005) . 34 Notice that this is a situation often encountered in environments with imperfect information. It is hence not specific to our analysis.
clean certain premises. This would suggest that the bidders may well operate in an independent private value setting, as required for the above story to hold. The following two-part argument speaks against our interpretation. First, if it really was the case that right-wing majority councils were more pro-competition and therefore resorted to favoritism, they could have practiced favoritism more explicitly e.g. by using scoring rules. In our perusal of the documents, we however found no trace of any explicit statements of favoritism. Second, favoritism could have lead to bids being endogenous, of which we found little evidence in our empirical analysis.
Conclusions
Does political representation affect how public spending is done and how are public services procured? To address these questions, we have studied the organization of public procurement of cleaning service contracts in Swedish municipalities. These services are simple to contract on and, as we have shown, do not vary much in quality. There are few, if any, compelling reasons to depart from standard auction formats and from the policy of granting the contract to the lowest bidder in this environment.
Our data come from a period when the EU (and thus Swedish) law allowed the municipalities high degrees of freedom in designing and running procurements. This institutional environment left a lot of room for discretion and may thus explain the outcome we observe in our data: Conditional on deciding to organize a procurement auction, no municipality committed to a standard (price) auction format of any kind, nor did they choose to have an explicit scoring rule.
Municipalities also exploited the freedom allowed by the law to invite bidders and choose the winner: Left-wing majority councils seem to invite fewer bidders than right-wing majority councils, conditional on restricting entry. In our data, the lowest bidder does not win 58% of the time, and the price difference between the lowest and the winning bids is 43% despite us finding little evidence for differences in product quality. We none the less find that municipalities do take bids (prices) into account in choosing whom to allocate the contract. Furthermore, the weight put on price varies with political ideology, with left-wing majority councils being 1.5 times as price-sensitive as right-wing majority councils.
Taken together, our results suggest that politics both does and does not matter in procurement. The decision to procure or not and the choice of entry mode are not subject to political influence in our data. Given this, it is somewhat striking to find that politics matters at the very micro-level: the decision of how many firms to invite seems to be correlated with the political orientation of municipalities and their price elasticity when determining whose bids gets chosen is affected by political partisanship.
These findings have implications for the literature on public spending and provision of services: While the propensity to procure cleaning services is not correlated with the political identity of the governing party, the design and especially award policies are. This finding casts doubt on the notion that marketoriented procurement is less subject to political concerns than public (internal) provision. This is a cause of concern, not least because political involvement may reduce the amount of cost savings that can be obtained from using procurement auctions (see Christoffersen, Paldam and Wurtz 2007 for evidence on the costs differences between public and private units in the cleaning of Danish schools).
Our findings also point to the importance of understanding better political incentives and how they shape the design of and award decisions in public procurement auctions, especially in auctions in which the non-price attributes of bid(der)s are allowed to be a determinant of the award decision. Why political competition matters, how it affects procurement outcomes (e.g. firms' bidding strategies) and which kinds of public procurement are most affected by political representation clearly warrant further analysis. Vagstad, Steinar. 1995 . "Promoting fair competition in public procurement. NOTES: The numbers reported are the coefficients of red m and its standard error from specifications without controls. Method of estimation: Columns 1-2: Logit; Column 3: Poisson with clustered standard errors. The sample consists in Column 1 of municipalities, in Column 2 of procurements, and in Columns 3 of auctions (objects) with restricted entry. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. "RD test" refers to the p-value of the test proposed in section 4.4.2.of Lee and Lemieux (2007) . Figure 1A . Example of typical contract notice.
"Quality monitoring: Documented quality monitoring, with representatives from B and E, should on the initiative from E take place once a month."
"Evaluation of tender/bid: Arvika Municipality will accept the bid considered to be the most advantageous economically with respect to price, quality, competence, and seriousness. The evaluation criteria are not ranked. Bids can be accepted without negotiation." M12 Dry mop, furnished space 8.5m 2 Once a week M13 Wet mop, furnished space 8.5m2
Once a week M61Dust/wash furnishing and inventories 8,5 m2 Once a week VX9 Empty waster-paper basket Five times a week. Figure 4A . Example of typical bid.
Space for extra information
Procuring entity
The object for which firm j is bidding
The bid in Swedish kronor (SEK). Annual price.
Identity of firm j and contact information. The identity is deleted due to that strict confidence was assured when the data was collected.
The results of the Wald-tests for the null hypotheses of the exogeneity of the bids are reported at the bottom of Table 5 in the main text. While the p-values for Columns (1) and (2) suggest that we can reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity for municipalities with a left-wing majority, the Wald-tests show that once firm fixed effects are allowed, the bids are not endogenous (see column (3)). This finding is consistent with the result of Bandiera, Pratt and Valletti (2007) , who find that most of the waste in their data on Italian procurement is "passive" (bad decisions) rather than "active" (generating utility to the procurer).
instrument for bid (price). By assumption, the instrument is independent of the vulnerability of municipality m to favoritism. Using the entire sample of bids, we then recover the expect bid function by regressing the bids on municipality and object characteristics, firm dummies, and the instrument. Finally, we compute the proxy, include it in the utility specification (interacted with 
